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Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and 
commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth as 
safely as we have. When we use the phrase “humans in the loop”, it could apply to almost any 
endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, 
building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing 
the focus to spaceflight, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for 
flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success.  
The paper discusses the concepts of human involvement in technological programs, how a 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using 
a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and the tradeoffs between having a human in 
the loop or not. Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or 
mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn’t always lowers the risk. 
I. Introduction 
here’s no denying that humans can perform extraordinary feats of brilliance to “save the day” as well as epic 
failures creating or adding to troubles that “ruin the day”. Decisions made under extreme circumstance would be 
described as correct if the outcome is favorable, but those same decisions and actions could also be described as 
“human error” if the result is a tragic failure. The difference between a good decision or action and a bad one is 
often identified by the result, and when dealing with interactions of complex processes and systems there are 
multiple ways to produce an acceptable result or failure. Given the number of variables at play in these types of 
situations, it is often difficult to know the outcome in advance. It is much easier to look at the situation in hindsight 
and pronounce its cause as human error. In reality, humans are always involved somewhere. Even automated 
systems are designed, built, programmed, tested, maintained and operated by humans. 
A PRA model is used to organize information for the various obstacles to mission success and identify potential 
risk contributors. These risks can be defined as threats to the project’s ability to meet objectives including: safety, 
loss of life, human injury, environmental damage, operational capability, performance, technical and design 
requirements, cost, or schedule. PRA’s are generally used for complex systems with high risk consequences with the 
intent of avoiding these outcomes.   
An effective PRA looks at system and process interactions and can identify where apparently minor failures can 
affect the system as a whole. Using the definition of risk as a feasible unfavorable outcome, identification of risk can 
be answered by three questions: (1) what can go wrong, (2) what is the likelihood of the potential events or scenarios 
and (3) what consequences could result from these events or scenarios?  
PRA and HRA were introduced into the NASA culture after the Space Shuttle had been flying for a number of 
years and experienced a major accident. The intent behind any risk assessment program is to identify potential risks 
associated with the identified goal (e.g. missions in the case of spaceflights) and analyze the concerns and 
consequences surrounding potential failure. Identifying and quantifying potential risks offers management an 
additional tool in the decision making process regarding whether to eliminate, mitigate or accept the consequences 
of the identified risks1. Direct human actions are covered by the human reliability assessments, while software 
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reliability values include potential human errors in development and testing, and equipment/system reliability values 
also include human errors in development and installation actions. 
II. Human Action Risk Contributions  
HRA as defined in a PRA model captures the risk associated with direct interactions between humans and 
equipment (aka, man-machine interface, human systems interaction, etc.), and predicts the impact of these 
interactions on the probability of overall mission failure. NASA personnel are highly trained and qualified, however, 
even the most highly qualified and trained individuals are susceptible to making errors that could impact the mission 
or crew.  Therefore, human reliability is included in PRA models. Human reliability represents the potential for 
humans to make a mistake given the variables inherent in a situation. The HRA is an evaluation of how an 
individual could act given the parameters of a defined failure scenario. It is not intended to place blame. 
Not all human errors have serious consequences. In the majority of cases they are unimportant, annoying or self-
corrected. Often, the way humans react to changing conditions are the only reason a process will continue to work. 
Unfortunately this flexibility in human actions can also cause what we describe as human errors. “The ability to 
adapt and compensate comes at a cost”2. The Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear 
Power Plant Applications3 identifies some of these types of errors as: 
 
• Errors of omission and commission 
• Slips/lapses, mistakes, and circumventions 
• Skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based errors 
• Information processing errors including items such as detection and situation assessment 
 
When human errors are viewed as a single risk driver, questions have arisen concerning the value of humans 
operating as part of the system. Attempting to remove the human from the equation and changing potential human 
error failure scenarios into automated actions could have consequences. When considering future manned 
spaceflight missions these consequences could include:   
 
1) When using software settings to determine when to abort there are questions regarding 
what to use as trigger points when conditions can vary, and how to avoid unnecessary Loss 
of Mission (LOM) because the automated system is too rigid.  
2) Automating activation of abort functions based on specific parameters defined with 
limited information may be based on conservative assumptions and create unnecessary 
LOM,  
3) Some potential vehicle separation issues may need crew intervention.  
4) Even with software controlled unmanned missions humans are involved with developing 
software codes, and uploading code and instructions to the spacecraft. 
5) Loss of flexibility and capability for the overall system since humans can backup multiple 
systems, perform multiple functions and fit individual incidents into the “big picture”. 
6) Automated systems cannot address potential situations that have not been identified but 
could escalate into failure events.   
 
Relying on software for expected or routine events may improve the reliability as long as all functions are 
identified and operate as expected. However, space flights are rarely routine and unexpected situations and 
unanticipated failures that affect software performance may occur and cause a LOM or Loss of Crew (LOC). This is 
especially true for new launch vehicle designs, exploration missions and activities intended to expand human 
knowledge. Using only automated systems would eliminate the opportunity for crew members to positively affect 
the event outcome. 
Table 2-1 provides a comparison of the risks involved with crew members in the loop and when crews are 
excluded and cannot interact with the flight system. 
 
Table 2-1:  Automated Flight Controls with Humans as Backup 
Inherent risks involved with 
using humans in the loop 
Inherent risks of not using 
humans in the loop 
Cause a failure  (errors of omission and commission) Lose flexible backup 
Not react in time (slips/lapses, mistakes, and Lose limited maintenance capability for minor repairs 





Misinterpret or misunderstand  (skill-, rule-, and 
knowledge-based errors or information processing errors 
including items such as detection and situation 
assessment) 
Lose oversight and minor problems dealt with as they 
arise 
Right action, wrong time (skill-, rule-, and knowledge-
based errors or information processing errors including 
items such as detection and situation assessment) 
Failure is failure, software doesn’t adapt unless in the 
programming 
Bad decisions cause failures (skill-, rule-, and 
knowledge-based errors or information processing errors 
including items such as detection and situation 
assessment) 
Does not react to any visual or physical “cues” not in 
the programing 
Bad decisions contribute to failure (skill-, rule-, and 
knowledge-based errors or information processing errors 
including items such as detection and situation 
assessment) 
Does not address unexpected consequences of 
programed actions 
 Loss of communication with software means loss of 
update capability 
 Cannot distinguish between “bad” data and “good” 
 
It’s impossible to eliminate all risks, the consequences of eliminating one risk may produce an unexpected result 
in another area. 
III. Reducing Risk; Why Not Just Automate 
Humans are always involved, either by direct actions or indirectly during design, development or operational 
planning.  Using software to control systems does not really eliminate the human, since the software codes are 
written by humans who depend on other humans to provide accurate analysis results and information, catch code 
errors, perform code downloads, and update software as errors, failures and changes occur.   
Also, automated systems do not mean that a human is not involved, someone is always monitoring, modifying 
and updating. An example is the use of auto-pilot on modern airplanes.  A routine airplane flight using autopilot 
follows a specific flight plan, has defined processes and procedures and performs well as long as all variables stay 
within the software expectations for system operations.  However, abnormal conditions require a human pilot who 
has the capability and flexibility to make decisions outside the parameters of the auto-pilot programming.  For an 
automated system, identification of requirements, planning, analysis, decision-making and testing is completed prior 
to use so that the system will react “automatically” to identified data input or set points.  Table 3-1 gives a general 
overview of things to consider when determining how to integrate human capabilities and automation. 
 
Table 3-1:  What to Consider When Determining the Use of Human Direction versus Automation 
Human More 
Effective/Efficient 
Automated System More 
Effective/Efficient 
When nothing goes as planned or expected Everything goes as planned or expected 
No set routine, needs flexible response Set routine with limited deviation 
Deal with unexpected consequences Capabilities all identified 
Need flexibility in actions for response Consistent, repetitive actions and activities 
Additional capabilities needed beyond original 
expectations 
Immediate response to event needed (too fast for 
human actions) 
Repair small problems to avoid them becoming 
large problems 
Barring software or system failures, always 
performs as programmed 
By adapting to the situation, people often provide 
the flexibility to “make it work” 
Complex or complicated actions needing quick 
response  
Human can be used to mitigate failures Performs for long durations 
When considering outside information and context 
in decision making (“it depends on…”) 
When there are no “maybes” in the decision 
process 
Threat detection using multiple subtle cues Quick response actions for set-points or limits 
  NOTES:  
1. Automated systems can only follow their programming 




2. Programming is done by humans based on what they expect to happen 
3. Changes to programming (updates) are developed and input by humans 
 
Computerized systems follow the programming. That programming is based on experience and knowledge as 
well as long hours of analysis, refinement, reviews, simulations, verifications and testing to confirm the expected 
response occurs. Years of experience with launching vehicles and satellites into space have provided NASA with the 
knowledge and data to be able to model and predict many aspects of a launch and mission. Spaceflight is a 
complicated and complex venture, and automated systems (like computers) are tools which used effectively can 
reduce risk. However, complete reliance on automated systems may not be an effective use since the unexpected 
generally occurs at some point in the mission. 
Manned spaceflight provides for the effective use of a combination of automated actions with human backups 
when software or other failures occur, or the software cannot address the unfolding event. This is especially true for 
flight situations which can become problematic for automated systems given the potential for “unknown unknowns” 
and “underappreciated/underestimated knowns”. Regardless of the amount of testing, analysis and experience 
behind the development of a new vehicle or booster system, progress rarely occurs without unexpected incidents and 
consequences. The human in the loop, either on the ground or in the vehicle is often the only way to address these 
unexpected situations.  The human in the loop can also provide real time minor corrections that can ultimately avoid 
multiple small failures resulting in a major failure. These types of efforts are rarely given credit or even recognized 
as part of the risk avoidance efforts since it’s hard to quantify something that didn’t or hasn’t happened. 
On the other side of this issue, there is a plethora of information, documented and speculated, on the subject of 
human error. In reviewing many of these instances attributed to human error, there are often contributing factors 
involved that increase the chances of making mistakes. Examples of these types of flaws include:  
 
• Badly designed control panels where switches or buttons are too close together  
• Known design problems that use a procedural fix instead of a physical fix  
• Procedures that are ambiguous  
• Lack of training  
• Bad lighting causing visual problems or confusion 
• Peripheral items that can contribute to unintended actions   
 
There are methods and techniques to reduce the potential for human error by identifying and addressing these 
types of issues to eliminate or mitigate conditions that would lead to errors. Using HRA to identify and quantify 
these risks provides management with additional information for understanding how to address these types of issues. 
IV. Identifying What Contributes to Risk and How Much  
By understanding what contributes to human action or decision “failures”, mitigations can often be 
recommended, including designs that limit the opportunity for operator errors.  Factors that affect crew performance 
include how these contributing conditions may change during different mission phases. The framework supporting 
performance of a human action includes the environmental conditions where the action occurs, interfaces with 
controls or equipment and factors that influence human behavior such as fatigue and training. Human Factors and 
Operations are involved in human interface issues that affect the crew (such as cabin design, operational processes, 
procedures and flight rules) and provide support during the mission. Previous NASA experience and lessons learned 
are implemented in current programs to improve performance. Human reliability assessments at a minimum review 
the following factors to determine their potential contributions to human error: time to act, complexity and general 
environment3. More in depth methods and techniques such as those addressed in Cognitive Reliability and Error 
Analysis Method: CREAM 4 consider environmental and physical factors which directly impact human performance.  
These CREAM performance factors include: Adequacy of Organization, Working Conditions, Adequacy MMI 
(Man Machine Interface) & Operational Support, Availability of Procedures/Plans, Number of Simultaneous Goals, 
Available Time, Concept of circadian rhythm (used as surrogate for physical, mental and behavioral changes 
responding to environment), Adequacy training & Preparation and Crew Collaboration Quality. 
Efforts to reduce risk associated with crew and ground support personnel actions include: 
 
• NASA trains crew, console controllers and support personnel to solve problems and react 
to failure scenarios.  This includes years of training, simulations, and operational 
experience. 




• NASA uses pre-planning and risk assessment to reduce risks. Models and simulations are 
used to identify potential problem areas and resolve issues so that these concerns can be 
eliminated or mitigated prior to launch. 
• NASA organizational support and monitoring is continuous, with experts on call. Prior to 
and during a mission, support staff are available to address any issues that may arise to 
ensure a safe and successful mission.    
• Crew and ground support personnel train for years prior to a mission. 
 
Current program efforts in the design phase provides insights regarding risks contributors for given parameters, 
allowing a better understanding of overall risk concerns and allow for trade studies as needed. One of the benefits of 
developing a PRA includes the capability to perform sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity analysis is a useful tool to 
determine the impact of how changes to the assumptions or variables will differ from the previous or baseline study.  
By modifying or changing specific variables in the initial scenario, the analyst, operators, and engineers can gain 
insight into how changes impact the results. Studies can be run on such diverse subjects as determining the 
importance of a specific component to identifying the impact of changing a basic assumption used as part of the 
PRA’s failure logic model. 
V. Human Interactions Can Be Good or Bad  
Human error often becomes an error after the fact. The same action can result in a tragic accident for one 
situation or a heroic action given a more favorable outcome. Human error has been reported as being responsible for 
60% - 80%5 of failures, accidents and incidents in high-risk industries.   
E. Hollnagel contends that people in the workplace generally adapt what they do to match the conditions they 
work in.  He describes this as an efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO)6. His concept contends that if the 
demand for safety is high, resources will be allocated until the safety goals are met, therefore greater “thoroughness” 
would result in an increase in safety. 
NASA Safety and Mission Assurance uses a variety of tools and techniques to ensure that risks are identified and 
addressed to meet program goals. 
 
The Good 
A recent HRA sensitivity study for the new Orion vehicle provided insight into how crew actions associated with 
mitigation of LOC scenarios would affect the overall risk by comparing the risk associated with the crew’s 
capability to initiate a manual abort and how risk changed with the removal of that capability. The result showed 
that ~33 % of overall risk was reduced when the crew could perform manual aborts versus having the crew as 
passengers only. During the Shuttle program, a similar sensitivity assessment was performed which assumed that 
neither the crew nor the mission control center could take action in response to failures causing a Loss of Crew 
and/or Vehicle (LOC/V). The difference in the risk when the crew and mission control actively responded to failures 
showed a risk reduction of ~91%.  
The result of the sensitivity studies demonstrate the value of having a highly trained, competent and flexible 
human backup system for expected and unexpected failures. While HRA assumes that humans will fail a percentage 
of the time, these studies show what would occur if a crew was not available to make the attempt. 
In a human versus computerized system, the human wins in the following areas: flexibility, research, deductions, 
problem solving, improvisation and troubleshooting. The automated/computerized system wins when: correct 
actions are known and consistency is paramount, actions need to occur too quickly for humans to react and when 
humans cannot survive in the environment. 
 
The Bad 
The human body also undergoes physical changes such as fatigue, inattention after long hours, medical issues, 
misunderstanding and miscommunications will always occur. Furthermore, even when the number of goals may be 
reasonable under most conditions, if multiple operations or short turn-around times due to changing conditions 
occurs this may impact the crew’s reactions. Conditions such as these often occur during critical times of flight such 
as take-off and landing, or under emergency scenario conditions. These types of situations can overwhelm even the 
best planning and simulation training. If humans can take direct action to save the vehicle, those actions taken at the 
wrong time or under the wrong conditions can also result in loss of the vehicle.  




VI. Summary  
On a really bad day when nothing is going as expected, an automated system gives up (i.e. will only do what it is 
programmed to do), but a human will keep trying and may succeed. History has shown this to be true during 
previous NASA missions when problems have occurred.  NASA’s human spaceflight program crews and support 
staff are competent, motivated, and experienced individuals who spend years training for each mission.  NASA 
Safety and Mission Assurance spends the time and resources to identify and reduce risk to improve safety.    
“To challenge the status quo, organizations must challenge the premise that the human is the weakest link in the 
workplace. On the contrary, when properly prepared, people are not something to be protected against; they are the 
strongest part of the performance equation. While technology, technical training and culture are important, the 
individual mind is more critical.”5 
 
Spaceflight is a risk, with or without human error. 
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